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PUBLIC LAW
discriminations created in making the refunds and reductions.8 1
A majority thought the dollar amount of reduction applicable
only to the test period and properly translated into tariff effect
on the basis of the data for that period by directing local pay
telephone calls to be reduced from 10¢ to 5¢ and intrastate tolls
by 20 percent.3 2 The utility sought to demonstrate that the effect
of these decreases was to exceed the ordered reduction of $3,-
940,000 both as to the test period and as to subsequent periods; in
utility calculations, however, no effect was given to the factor of
acceleration in use resulting from a lower rate and hence the
demonstration was rejected as inconclusive.3 The effect of the
majority decision was also to reject the argument implicit in the
utility's approach, that, even conceded discrimination in the de-
crease and refund procedures could not be remedied if the return
authorized for the test period was not earned in subsequent
periods. The commission argued, in opposing grant of a rehear-
ing, that the remedy for any inadequacies in a prior rate de-
termination lies in obtaining an increase upon the basis of new
test period data rather than by discriminatory withholding of a
share of the refunds from some telephone users simply because
they had paid tolls and charges for the utility's services through
independent telephone companies instead of directly to the util-
ity.34 In the actual sequence of events in the case of this utility,
such an increase was subsequently granted. 35
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Robert L. Roland*
Although with one exception hereinafter discussed the cur-
rent session of the court did not see the rendition of any case of
unusual import in the field of state and local taxation, it did pro-
duce several decisions of interest. Collector of Revenue v. Frost
and its companion cases' proved that a taxpayer can be as tena-
31. Id. at 71.
32. Id. at 66.
33. Id. at 72-73.
34. Ibid. Supreme Court Docket No. 45,493, Commission's Memorandum in
Opposition to Application for Rehearing.
35. See Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission, 239 La. 175, 118 So.2d 372 (1960).
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar; former Collector of Revenue for the State of
Louisiana; and Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 240 La. 1067, 127 So.2d 151 (1961) ; Collector of Revenue v. Whited, 240
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cious as the tax collector, although not quite as successful. De-
spite the fact that the identical legal issues involved in these
suits had been resolved adversely on identical pleas only thirteen
months previously in the case of Collector of Revenue v. Olvey,2
taxpayer, as Justice Hawthorne pointed out, strenuously urged
that the decision in Olvey was wrong and should be overruled.
The court considered each of the seven points advanced by tax-
payer at some length and concluded that its opinion in the Olvey
case was correct and should be followed. The statutory pro-
visions involved 3 could scarcely have supported any other con-
clusion. In another interesting case, two questions concerning
the Louisiana sales and use tax law 4 were answered contrary to
taxpayer's contentions, temporarily at least.5 Taxpayer in Halli-
burton Oil Well Cementing Company v. Reily6 contended that
such portion of the cost of its equipment as was represented by
labor and shop overhead should be excluded from the "cost price"
in computing the use tax due by it on specialized equipment
manufactured by it in Oklahoma and imported into Louisiana.
It based its principal argument on constitutional grounds, con-
tending that a contrary application would violate the "equal
protection," "commerce," and "due process" clauses of the Con-
stitution of the United States, inasmuch as a local "manufac-
turer-user" would not have to include the cost of labor and over-
head in its tax computation. Justice Hamlin, as organ of the
court, quite correctly, in the opinion of this writer, pointed out
that a question of use tax (as opposed to sales tax) was involved;
that under well-recognized jurisprudence, the imposition of a use
tax does not violate the commerce clause in any manner whatso-
ever; and that there was no violation of either "equal protection"
or "due process." The fallacy in taxpayer's contention on this
point was quickly recognized by the court which reminded that
there is a clear distinction between a sale and the sales tax due
thereon and a use and the use tax due thereon and that a more
apposite comparison would be between the use tax on the as-
La. 1076, 127 So. 2d 154 (1961) ; Collector of Revenue v. Moore, 240 La. 1077,
127 So.2d 154 (1961) ; Collector of Revenue v. Whited, 240 La. 1079, 127 So.2d
155 (1961).
2. 238 La. 980, 117 So.2d 563 (1960). See discussion of this case in 21
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 350 (1961).
3. LA. R.S. 47:21 et seq. (income tax law), 47:1501 et seq. (administrative
provisions) (1950).
4. Id. 47:301 et seq.
5. By order dated October 9, 1961, the United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction.
6. 241 La. 67, 127 So.2d 502 (1961).
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sembled equipment and a sales tax on the same equipment. Cer-
tainly, the clear language of R.S. 47:301(3)7 in defining the
cost price upon which the use tax is calculated, as well as the
court's earlier decision in the S.E.W. case8 to the effect that the
value or worth of the property at the time of its importation
governed for use tax purposes, lend ample support to the conclu-
sion reached in the instant case. Whether the United States Su-
preme Court agrees with this analysis remains to be seen.
The other question involved the taxability for use tax pur-
poses of property purchased outside the state from persons not
regularly engaged in the business of selling such property. Tax-
payer contended that since the transaction would have been free
from sales tax had it occurred in Louisiana, 9 the imposition of
the use tax therefore deprived it of its property without due
process of law and that such taxation also constituted an unlaw-
ful discrimination against interstate commerce. The court re-
jected an Alabama case,'0 apparently squarely in point and con-
cluded that there was no discrimination nor deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law. Although the sales tax is not
applicable to isolated or occasional sales by virtue of R.S. 47:
301(10)," there is no such provision relative to the use tax on
property purchased outside the state in an isolated or occasional
sale and the holding of the case appears correct so far as the
statute itself is concerned. The United States Supreme Court
will apparently have the last word on whether or not the statute
violates any constitutional provisions. 12 If the position of tax-
payer on this point is ultimately sustained and corrective legisla-
tion is not forthcoming, the door will be opened to substantial
tax savings in the area of sales and use taxes.
7. LA. R.S. 47:301(3) (1950) : "'Cost price' means the actual cost of the
articles of tangible personal property without any deductions therefrom on ac-
count of the cost of materials used, labor or service cost, transportation charges
or any other expenses whatsoever."
8. Fontenot v. S.E.W. Oil Corp., 232 La. 1011, 95 So.2d 638 (1957). In this
case the court rendered a highly equitable decision on somewhat questionable
grounds-in light of the explicit language of LA. R.S. 47:301(3) (1950), supra
note 7.
9. LA. R.S. 47:301(10) (1950) reads in part as follows: "[Niow does it
['sale at retail'] include an isolated or occasional sale of tangible personal prop-
erty by a person not engaged in such business."
10. Alabama v. Bay Towing and Dredging Co., 265 Ala. 282, 90 So.2d 743
(1956).
11. See quotation note 9 supra.
12. By order dated October 9, 1961, the United States Supreme Court noted
probable jurisdiction.
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The case of United Gas Corp. v. Fontenot8 involved the ap-
plicability of the state's income tax law 14 to dividends and gain
from the sale of stock owned by a Delaware corporation having
its principal place of business in Louisiana. The stock certifi-
cates were kept outside Louisiana and were never used in connec-
tion with taxpayer's business so as to acquire a business situs.
The court traced the history of situs for tax purposes; recog-
nized that constitutionally, income could be taxed under the the-
ory of legal domicile or business situs or commercial domicile;
and found that such a commercial domicile existed in this case;
the tax was upheld. Although the Arkansas Fuel Oil case' fore-
shadowed the result in the instant case, the concise opinion of the
Chief Justice on the questions of situs is a distinct contribution
to the field of state and local taxation in Louisiana. The opinion
also contains an exhaustive history of the corporate structure
and management involved - a history largely developed by inde-
pendent research on the part of the court. 6
The companion case, 17 involving the applicability of the cor-
poration franchise tax 8 to the properties involved in the other
case, established a most important principal. Justice Hamiter,
speaking for a divided court, held that intangibles cannot be al-
located on the basis of commercial domicile for franchise tax
purposes. The decision is a landmark in the field of Louisiana
corporation franchise taxes, since it overturned an interpre-
tation of long standing by the Department of Revenue and estab-
lishes quite firmly, that unless and until the legislature deter-
mines otherwise, intangibles for franchise tax purposes must
be allocated to the legal domicile of the corporation unless they
have been so used as to acquire a business situs in Louisiana.
The court also indicated that by business situs, it meant use
as an integral part of its business in Louisiana such as pledge,
or otherwise.' 9 Thus, although the taxpayer achieved victory in
only one case, his victory was a notable one, and should be of
value to many foreign corporations doing business in Louisiana.
13. 241 La. 488, 129 So.2d 748 (1961).
14. LA. R.S. 47:21 et seq. (1950).
15. Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp. v. Fontenot, 225 La. 166, 72 So.2d 465 (1954).
16. 129 So.2d 748, 761-74 (La. 1961).
17. United Gas Corp. v. Fontenot, 241 La. 564, 129 So.2d 776 (1961).
18. LA. R.S. 47:601 et seq. (1950).
19. 129 So.2d 776, 779 (La. 1961).
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